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Abstract: Mather (2019) provides an excellent overview of the literature on octopus perception,
cognition, memory, and behavior. Anyone interested in cephalopod cognition and brain
organization will find her target article informative and interesting. In this commentary, I challenge
the idea that an individual organism must have an individual mind. Given the structure of the
octopus brain and their complex behavior, one must consider the possibility that an octopus is a
community of minds rather than a single mind.
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Mather (2019) provides an excellent overview of the literature on octopus perception, cognition,
memory, and behavior. It also provides a detailed but understandable tutorial on the neural
organization across octopus species and other cephalopods. Mather shows that octopus behavior
is complex and flexible. She also makes the case that octopuses have conscious and unified
awareness. However, she makes unwarranted assumptions in discussing the concept of mind and
self-awareness, and that will be the basis of my commentary. Along with Carls-Diamante (2017,
2019), I think the evidence is still not clear if a better account of octopus behavior rests in their
ability to take advantage of multiple conscious representations. Thus, I present the unorthodox
position that octopus cognition may be a community of minds rather than a unified mind.
Unified vs. multiple minds. Mather provides compelling evidence that the neural and cognitive
mechanisms underlying octopus behavior across the many octopus species are vastly different
from their vertebrate analogs in birds and mammals. This view starts with the observation that
the majority of neurons in a typical octopus are in its arms, not in its brain. This contrasts with the
typical vertebrate organization in which neurons are concentrated in the brain (Thivierge &
Marcus, 2007). What might it mean for the concept of mind if most of the neural system is
situated in the part of the anatomy that engages in the world rather than sequestered in a central
brain? Whereas we think of ourselves and infer for other mammals that one unified mind exists
that creates a continuous identity, might it be that mind for an octopus is an interactive
community of independent “arm-minds”? We know that individual octopus arms can be
conditioned independent of each other (Wells, 1978). Moreover, some data suggest that severed
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octopus arms continue to function for some time after they are detached from the animal
(Sumbre, Gutfreund, Fiorito, Flash, & Hochner, 2001). Thus, Carls-Diamante (2017, 2019) suggests
that an individual octopus may be a community of arms rather than a unified consciousness. Such
a view is not inconsistent with some degree of central control that can be invoked when
coordinated action or unusual circumstances are identified. Nor does the view that an octopus
may be a collection of interconnected minds rather than a unified one negate the complex and
vertebrate-like things that Mather shows an octopus can do. As a counter-example, Mather points
to split-brain patients who act in odd ways because of their severed corpus callosum, but still
experience a unified consciousness. The point is well-taken, but to call on human analogs, one
could also invoke Dissociative Identity Disorder, in which multiple human minds inhabit a single
brain (Ross, 1997). Just given octopus neurological idiosyncrasies and their unique behavioral
adaptations, I wonder if it is any less consistent with the data to think of multiple minds, rather
than a single mind that conforms with what we know about vertebrates.
In The Language Instinct, the linguist Steven Pinker (1994) imagines a world in which some
biologists are elephants. In this saucy analogy that pokes fun at animal-language projects, Pinker
imagines how such elephant biologists would puzzle over other animals’ poor nasal dexterity
(Pinker, 1994, p. 332). His general point is that it is unwise to judge other creatures by the metric
of our evolutionary strength, that is, language (or our flexible intelligence). Mather suggests that
a unified mind makes the octopus more cognitive and more intelligent because a unified mind
makes them more like us. There are multiple ways in which a species can demonstrate intelligence
and adaptability. For elephants, it is trunk dexterity, whereas for humans, it is language. It is
thought-provoking to consider that octopus species achieve their cognitive flexibility through
internal communication among independent minds.
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